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Abstract
Chaitin’s work, in its depth and breadth, encompasses many areas
of scientific and philosophical interest. It helped establish the accepted
mathematical concept of randomness, which in turn is the basis of tools
that I have developed to justify and quantify what I think is clear evi-
dence of the algorithmic nature of the world. To illustrate the concept I
will establish novel upper bounds of algorithmic randomness for elemen-
tary cellular automata. I will discuss how the practice of science consists in
conceiving a model that starts from certain initial values, running a com-
putable instantiation, and awaiting a result in order to determine where
the system may be in a future state—in a shorter time than the time
taken by the actual unfolding of the phenomenon in question. If a model
does not comply with all or some of these requirements it is traditionally
considered useless or even unscientific, so the more precise and faster the
better. A model is thus better if it can explain more with less, which is at
the core of Chaitin’s ”compression is comprehension”. I will pursue these
questions related to the random versus possibly algorithmic nature of the
world in two directions, drawing heavily on the work of Chaitin. I will also
discuss how the algorithmic approach is related to the success of science at
producing models of the world, allowing computer simulations to better
understand it and make more accurate predictions and interventions.
Keywords: model-driven science; algorithmic randomness; Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity; algorithmic information theory; mechanistic models;
patterns.
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1 Introduction
The work of Greg Chaitin has been at the centre of my intellectual interests. He
was not only one of the examiners for my PhD in computer science in 2011, but
my work would have not been possible without his seminal ideas. I met Greg
in 2006, having been invited to his home and to his office at IBM’s legendary
Thomas J. Watson Research Center (see Fig. 1), both in Yorktown Heights,
NY, U.S. His house was typical of an intellectual, full of objects and books
piled one on top of the other. But Greg also had exotic pieces of sculpture
scattered around his house, and an over-representation of Leibniz- and Go¨del-
related books, the two major sources of influence on his work and thinking.
Figure 1: (Top) A picture of Greg Chaitin I took outside his longtime office at
IBM Research headquarters, the Thomas J. Watson Research Center. (Bottom)
The two sides of the medal I helped Wolfram design, featuring material relating
to Chaitin’s life achievements on the obverse and Leibniz’ own medal celebrating
binary arithmetic on the reverse.
In 2008, I organized a two-part panel discussion (Fig. 2) during the Wolfram
Science conference at the University of Vermont in Burlington, an event that,
together with a second meeting I organized (with Adrian German) in 2008 at
Indiana University Bloomington 2, will, I believe, come to be regarded as a
historic. The first part of the panel discussion addressed the question ”Is the
Universe random?” Participating were Cris Calude, John Casti, Greg Chaitin,
Paul Davies, Karl Svozil and Stephen Wolfram. The second part addressed
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the question ”What is computation and How does nature compute?”. The
participants were Ed Fredkin, Greg Chaitin, Tonny Legett, Cris Calude, Rob
de Ruyter, Tom Toffoli, and Stephen Wolfram, with George Johnson, Gerardo
Ortiz and myself serving as moderators. Transcriptions of both parts were
published in my volume [21] and [22].
In 2007, I also helped Stephen Wolfram design a commemorative medal to
celebrate the 60th birthday of Gregory Chaitin, which also involved minting for
the first time a 300 year old medal originally designed by Gottfried Leibniz to
celebrate the invention or discovery of binary arithmetic (see Fig. 1). I published
a blog post soon after we came up with the idea for the medal, explaining the
pre- and post-minting story of the medal [26].
Panel Part I: Is the universe random?
Panel Part II: What is computation and How does nature compute?
Figure 2: Part I and Part II panel discussion pictures. (Top) From left to right:
Hector Zenil, Stephen Wolfram, Paul Davies, Ugo Pagallo, Greg Chaitin, Cris
Calude, Karl Svozil, Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, and John Casti. (Bottom) From
left to right: Hector Zenil, Greg Chaitin, Ed Fredkin, Rob de Ruyter, Tonny
Legett, Cris Calude, Tom Toffoli, and Stephen Wolfram. Transcriptions in [21]
and [22].
At the centre of my research is Greg Chaitin’s work on what is known as
algorithmic probability, which in turn is related to Chaitin’s Omega (Ω) num-
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ber, also called the halting probability. My very first research paper [24] was
published in Chaitin’s 60th birthday festchrift [25]. The paper advanced the
claim and provided the first numerical evidence of a bias present in nature that
I later advanced in a contribution that won an FQXi prize [36] on the digi-
tal or analogue nature of the universe. Such claims have more recently been
noticed and expanded [27], a further confirmation in which my own methods
played an important role again. In a later follow-up piece, I connected Tur-
ing patterns with Turing machines, explaining how symmetry-breaking creates
structure—as opposed to randomness—out of nothing, with only computability
being assumed [23].
2 Complexity from Computation
Not only did Chaitin help found one of the most exciting areas of modern science
(computer science), but it may turn out that his contribution, together with that
of Alan Turing, may have had a more profound effect on our understanding of
our physical reality than we had hitherto supposed.
At the beginning of the twentieth century and through the end of the Second
World War, computers were human, not electronic, mainly women. The work of
a computer consisted precisely in solving tedious arithmetical operations with
paper and pencil. This was looked upon as work of an inferior order. At an
international mathematics conference in 1928, David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ack-
ermann suggested the possibility that a mechanical process could be devised
that was capable of proving all mathematical assertions. This notion is referred
to as Entscheidungsproblem (in German), or ‘the decision problem’. If a human
computer did no more than execute a mechanical process, it was not difficult
to imagine that arithmetic would be amenable to a similar sort of mechaniza-
tion. The origin of Entscheidungsproblem dates back to Gottfried Leibniz, who
having (around 1672) succeeded in building a machine based on the ideas of
Blaise Pascal that was capable of performing arithmetical operations (named
Staffelwalze or the Step Reckoner), imagined a machine of the same kind that
would be capable of manipulating symbols to determine the truth value of math-
ematical principles. To this end Leibniz devoted himself to conceiving a formal
universal language, which he designated characteristica universalis, a language
that would encompass, among other things, binary language and the definition
of binary arithmetic.
In 1931, Kurt Go¨del [9] arrived at the conclusion that Hilbert’s intention
(also referred to as ‘Hilbert’s programme’) of proving all theorems by mechaniz-
ing mathematics was not possible under certain reasonable assumptions. Go¨del
advanced a formula that codified an arithmetical truth in arithmetical terms
and that could not be proved without arriving at a contradiction. Even worse,
it implied that there was no set of axioms that contained arithmetic free of true
formulae that could not be proved.
In 1944, Emil Post, another key figure in the development of the concepts of
computation and computability (focusing especially on the limits of computa-
4
tion) found [10] that this problem was intimately related to one of the twenty-
three problems (the tenth) that Hilbert, speaking at the Sorbonne in Paris, had
declared the most important challenges for twentieth century mathematics.
Usually, Hilbert’s programme is considered a failure, though in fact it is
anything but. Even though it is true that Go¨del debunked [9] the notion that
what was true could be proved, presenting a negative solution to the ‘problem of
decision’, and Martin Davis [11] (and independently, Julia Robinson [12]) used
Go¨del’s negative result to provide a negative solution to Hilbert’s tenth problem
(the argument for which was completed by Yuri Matiyasevich [13]), Hilbert’s
supposedly failed programme originated what we now know as Computer Sci-
ence, the field that wouldn’t have been possible without Alan M. Turing’s con-
cept of the universal machine.
2.1 One machine for everything
Not long after Go¨del, Alan M. Turing made his appearance. Turing contem-
plated the problem of decision in much cruder terms. If the act of performing
arithmetical operations is mechanical, why not substitute a mechanical device
for the human computer? Turing’s work represented the first abstract descrip-
tion of the digital general-purpose computer as we know it today. Turing defined
what in his article he termed an ‘a’ computer (for ‘automatic’), now known as
a Turing machine.
A Turing machine is an abstract device which reads or writes symbols on a
tape one at a time, and can change its operation according to what it reads,
and move forwards or backwards through the tape. The machine stops when it
reaches a certain configuration (a combination of what it reads and its internal
state). It is said that a Turing machine produces an output if the Turing machine
halts, while the locations on the tape the machine has visited represent the
output produced.
The most remarkable idea advanced by Turing is his demonstration that
there is an ‘a’ machine that is able to read other ‘a’ machines and behave as
they would for an input s. In other words, Turing proved that it was not
necessary to build a new machine for each different task; a single machine that
could be reprogrammed sufficed. This erases the distinction between program
and data, as well as between software and hardware, as one can always codify
data as a program to be executed by another Turing machine and vice versa,
just as one can always build a universal machine to execute any program and
vice versa.
Turing also proved that there are Turing machines that never halt, and
if a Turing machine is to be universal, and hence able to simulate any other
Turing machine or computer program, it is actually expected that it will never
halt for an infinite number of inputs of a certain type (while halting for an
infinite number of inputs of some other type). And this is what Turing would
have expected, given Go¨del’s results and what he wanted to demonstrate: that
Hilbert’s mechanization of mathematics was impossible. This result is known as
the undecidability of the halting problem. In his seminal article Turing defined
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not only the basis of what we today know as digital general-purpose computers,
but also software, programming and subroutines. And thus without a doubt it
represents the best answer to date that we have to the question ‘What is an
algorithm?’
In fact in Alan Turing’s work on his universal machine, he even introduced
the concept of a subroutine that helped him in his machine construction. These
notions are today the cornerstone of the field that Turing, more than anyone
else, helped establish, viz. Computer Science.
Once we approach the problem of defining what an algorithm is and arrive at
the concept of universality that Turing advanced, the question to be considered
in greater detail concerns the nature of algorithms. Given that one now has
a working definition of the algorithm, one can begin to think about classifying
problems, algorithms and computer programs by, for example, the time they
take or the storage memory they may require to be executed. One may assume
that the time required for an algorithm to run would depend on the type of
machine, given that running a computer program on a Pentium PC is very
different from executing it on a state-of-the-art super computer. This is why
the concept of the Turing machine was so important—because any answers to
questions about problem and algorithm resources will only make sense if the
computing device is always the same. And that device is none other than the
universal Turing machine. So for example, every step that a Turing machine
performs while reading its tape is counted as a time step. Many algorithms can
arrive at the same conclusion taking different paths, but some may be faster than
others, but this is now a carefully considered matter when fixing the framework
for Turing’s model of computation: one asks whether there is an algorithm that
surpasses all others in economy as regards the resources required when using
exactly the same computing device. These are the questions that opened up an
entire new field in the wake of Turing’s work, the development of which Turing
would certainly have been delighted to witness. This field is today referred to as
the theory of Computational Complexity, which would not have been possible
without a concept such as that of the universal Turing machine. The theory
of Computational Complexity focuses on classifying problems and algorithms
according to the time they take to compute when larger inputs are considered,
and on how size of input and execution time are related to each other. This is
all connected to two basic resources needed in any computation: space (storage)
and time. For example, one obvious observation relating to this theory is that
no algorithm will need more space than time to perform a computation. One
can then quickly proceed to ask more difficult but more interesting questions,
such as whether a machine can execute a program faster if it is allowed to behave
probabilistically instead of deterministically. What happens if one adds more
than one tape to a universal Turing machine operation? Would that amount to
implementing an algorithm to solve a problem much faster? Or one may even
ask whether there is always an efficient algorithm for every inefficient algorithm,
a question that may lead us to a fascinating topic connecting computers and
physics.
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2.2 The world of simple programs
If algorithms can come in a variety of types, some slow, others faster, what is
it that allows nature to produce, with no apparent effort, what seem to us to
be complex objects? These range from the laws of physics to the formation of
matter and galaxies to the beginning of life on Earth (and possibly in other
parts of the universe). In the end, one can see all these natural phenomena as
a kind of computation, regardless of whether it is of exactly the same type as
that performed by a Turing machine. This latter possibility cannot be com-
pletely disregarded. Thanks to Turing we know that even simple devices such
as universal Turing machines possess incredible power.
One of the natural world’s most fascinating characteristics is that it presents
a wide range of physical and biological systems that behave in different ways,
just like algorithms, most of them having some regular features while nonethe-
less being hard to predict. Climate is a case in point. Even though it is cyclical,
it is impossible to predict its details more than a week in advance. Where does
nature’s complexity come from? Throughout human history we have encoun-
tered objects, in particular mathematical ones, that seem complex to us. One
set of such objects comprises numbers that can be expressed as the division p/q,
with p and q being integers. Numbers 5, 0.5 or even infinite numbers such as
0.333. . . can be written as 5/1, 1/2, and 1/3, respectively. But as far back as
the ancient Greeks numbers have been known, such as pi and the square root
of 2, which cannot be expressed in this way. One could think of arithmetical
division as an algorithm that can be performed by a Turing machine, the result
being provided in the output tape. Multiplication, for example, is an algorithm
to shorten the number of steps needed to perform the same operation using only
addition. In the case of numbers that admit a rational representation p/q, the
algorithm of the division of integers consists of the common procedure of finding
quotients and remainders. In the case of numbers such as pi and the square root
of 2, the algorithm produces an infinite non-periodic expansion, so that the only
way to represent them is symbolically (i.e. pi and
√
2). The Pythagoreans found
that those numbers with ostensible infinite complexity could be produced from
very simple operations, for example, when seeking the value of the hypotenuse
of a right triangle with sides of length 1. Since Euclid, it has also been known
that such numbers are not the exception among real numbers that are found,
for example, in the continuous interval (0, 1).
In algorithmic terms, rational and irrational numbers are different in nature.
When one starts a Turing machine that implements the algorithm for division,
there is no algorithm that allows for the production of an irrational number
followed by halting, whereas the division of rational numbers can halt (when
the remainder is zero) or enter an infinite cycle that will produce a repetitive
decimal expansion.
In engineering, including systems programming, the intuition of what is
complex (in comparison to an irrational number in mathematics, for example)
has been radically different.
The usual assumption has been that to produce something that seems com-
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plex, a process that is just as complex has to be devised. This issue, however,
is closely connected to Turing’s concept of universality, given that a universal
Turing machine that is programmable is, in principle, capable of producing any
degree of ‘complexity’, for example, the type of complexity (or randomness)
that one can see in the decimal expansion of pi.
If Euclid’s algorithm for division or pi can produce such apparent complexity,
how usual is it to run a random computer program that produces the same
complexity? If computer programs that produce complexity need a very complex
description, the probability of finding one small enough would be very low. For
example, even though Turing’s 1936 article contains all the main elements of
the traditional description of a universal Turing machine capable of reproducing
the type of complexity to be found in the digits of pi, the construction of his
universal machine requires at least 18 states, and at least 23 instructions (the
exact number cannot be calculated on the basis of Turing’s article due to the
fact that he uses subroutines that can be implemented on machines of different
sizes).
Whatever the actual threshold for reaching Turing universality, it had typi-
cally been thought to be high (a case in point: von Neumann’s universal builder,
a system that was the anticipation of the modern concept of cellular automata,
requires 29 states), and it was thought that a universal machine would require
a certain minimum complexity (at least as to the number of states and symbols
required to describe it). In an experiment with extremely small and simple
computer programs, Stephen Wolfram found that this threshold of complexity
and universality was likely to be extremely low [32], and that very little was
required to find a machine that produced high complexity or that was capa-
ble of being Turing universal. Indeed, not only did Wolfram find a very small
Turing machine with only 2 symbols and 5 states that was capable of carrying
out universal computation under some very simple conditions, that is, a com-
puter that was powerful enough to emulate any standard computer, there was
another Turing machine that Wolfram suspected was Turing-universal, and to
ascertain whether this was so, in 2007 Todd Rowland and I organized a prize
competition (https://www.wolframscience.com/prizes/tm23/) with a view
to determining how simple the rules for a universal Turing machine could in
fact be.
Wolfram’s other favourite computer programs are called Elementary Cellular
Automata [32] and it is on one of these that the 2,5 original smallest universal
Turing machines are based.
Elementary Cellular Automata (ECA) are another superb example of a com-
puting model capable of very rich behaviour. ECA are minimalistic computer
programs that are very visual, as they print out their space-time evolution in
two dimensions and can be subjected to easy visual inspection. Recently, my
colleagues and I found another extremely small Turing-universal computer by
combining two ECA, which are themselves extremely simple [8].
In Fig. 3, I show how the ideas of Chaitin (and Kolmogorov and Solomonoff)
can help understand the complexity of ECA by looking at how difficult it is to
describe them succinctly from their generating model. The simplified rule shown
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in Fig. 3 is an upper bound on their Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity. Such
simple estimations already provide a much better characterization than other
simplifications, such as that of the so-called Langton’s λ parameter, as they
correspond better to the literature on the complexity of ECA. And even better
estimations and tighter bounds can be found using more powerful approaches
based on Chaitin’s (and Levin’s) work, notably with the help of two methods
that I and my team put together called CTM and BDM (as shown in Fig. 3),
rooted in a beautiful concept called algorithmic probability, which is deeply
related to Chaitin’s own Ω number.
2.3 Algorithmic probabilities
Just as the formulae for the production of the digits of pi are compressed versions
of pi, the laws of physics can be seen as systems that compress natural phenom-
ena. These laws are valuable because it is thanks to them that the result of a
natural phenomenon can be predicted without having to wait for it to unfold in
real time, e.g. one can solve the equations that describe planetary movement
instead of waiting two years to know the future positions of a planet. For all
practical purposes the laws of physics are like computer programs and the sci-
entific models we have of them: executable on digital computers and susceptible
of numerical solutions.
At the centre of Chaitin’s work related to his Chaitin Ω [28], and also the
variation introduced by Solomonoff [31] and Levin [30], is the notion of algo-
rithmic probability, which can be defined as,
AP (s) =
∑
p:U(p)=s
1/2|p|
That is, the sum over all the programs p for which a universal Turing machine
U outputs s and halts.
The notion behind AP is very intuitive. If one wished to produce the digits of
pi randomly, one would have to try time after time until one managed to hit upon
the first numbers corresponding to an initial segment of the decimal expansion
of pi. The probability of success is extremely small: 1/10 digits multiplied by the
desired quantity of digits. For example, 1/102400 for a segment of 2400 digits
of pi. But if instead of shooting out random numbers one were to shoot out
computer programs to be run on a digital computer, the result would be very
different.
A program that produces the digits of pi would have a higher probability
of being produced by a computer. Concise and known formulas for pi could
be implemented as short computer programs that would generate any arbitrary
number of digits of pi.
2.4 Algorithmic Chaitin complexity
The length of the shortest program that produces a string is today the mathe-
matical definition of randomness, as introduced by Kolmogorov [29], Chaitin [28],
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and Solomonoff [31], and later expanded by Levin [30], and also called Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity.
The idea is relatively simple. If a string s of length |s| cannot be produced
by a program |p| shorter than |s| in bits, then the string s is random because it
cannot be effectively described in a shorter way than by s itself, there being no
program p that generates s whose length is shorter than s. Formally,
CU (s) = min{|p| : U(p) = s}
where U is a universal Turing machine. The invariance theorem [29, 28, 31]
guarantees that the value of C, whether calculated with one particular universal
Turing machine or any other universal Turing machine, is the same at the limit.
Formally, if U1 and U2 are two universal Turing machines and CU1(s) and CU2(s)
are the values for the algorithmic complexity of s for U1 and U2 respectively,
there exists a constant c such that
|CU1(s)− CU2(s)| < c
Thus, the longer the string, the less important c is and the more stable the
algorithmic complexity value C is. One of the disadvantages of C is that, given
the halting problem for Turing machines, C is not computable, which is to say
that given a string, there is no algorithm that returns the length of the shortest
computer program that produces it.
2.5 Complexity is in inverse relation to probability
Algorithmic probability and algorithmic complexity K are inversely propor-
tional, as established by the so-called algorithmic Coding theorem [16, 25]:
| − log2AP (s)− C(s)| < c
where c is a constant independent of s. The Coding theorem implies that the
algorithmic complexity can be estimated from the frequency of a string.
To illustrate the above let us consider pi. Under the assumption of Borel’s
absolute normality of pi, whose digits appear randomly distributed, and with
no knowledge of the deterministic source and nature of pi as produced by short
mathematical formulae, we ask how an entropy versus an algorithmic metric
performs. First, the Shannon entropy rate (thus assuming the uniform distribu-
tion along all integer sequences of N digits) of the N first digits of pi, in any base,
would suggest maximum randomness at the limit. However, without access to
or without making assumptions as regards the probability distribution, approxi-
mations to algorithmic probability would assign pi high probability, and thus the
lowest complexity by the Coding theorem, as has been done in [33, 34, 17, 18].
Just as with pi but in application to graphs and networks, it has been proven
how certain graphs can be artificially constructed to target any level of Shannon
entropy [19, 20], preserving low algorithmic randomness.
But how relevant is the algorithmic Coding theorem in explaining, e.g., nat-
ural phenomena, if it only applies to Turing-universal systems? We know that
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the natural world allows and can carry out Turing-universal computation be-
cause we have been able to build computers that take elements from nature and
make them perform as general-purpose computers. However, we don’t know
how much of the natural world is Turing-computable or how physical laws may
naturally implement any form of computation. So, in [15] we showed that up
to 60% of the bias found in the output of systems that are not Turing universal
may be explained by the algorithmic Coding theorem. This means that this
theorem is far more relevant than expected, as it not only explains the way data
and patterns distribute for a very particular computational model, but does so,
to a considerable extent, for basically any computing model. It is not difficult
to imagine that nature operates at some of these levels, perhaps not even on
a fixed one but at multiple scales, with the algorithmic Coding theorem being
relevant to all of them.
2.6 The Coding Theorem Method
The algorithmic Coding Theorem Method (CTM) [33, 34] provides the means
for approximation via the frequency of a string. Now, why is this so? The
underlying mathematics originates from the relation specified by algorithmic
probability between frequency of production of a string from a random program
and its algorithmic complexity. It is also therefore denoted as the algorithmic
Coding theorem, in contrast to another well known coding theorem in classical
information theory. Essentially, the numerical approximation hinges on the fact
that the more frequently a string (or object) occurs, the lower its algorithmic
complexity. Conversely, strings with a lower frequency have higher algorithmic
complexity. Otherwise stated,
CTM(s) = − log2AP (s) + c
The way to implement a compression algorithm at the level of Turing ma-
chines, unlike popular compression algorithms, which are heavily based on Shan-
non entropy, is to go through all possible compression schemes. This is equiva-
lent to traversing all possible programs that are a compressed version of a piece
of data, which is exactly what the CTM algorithm does.
2.7 The Block Decomposition Method
Our approach to Chaitin’s halting probability and Solomonoff-Levin’s algorith-
mic probability consists in asking after the probability of a matrix being gener-
ated by a random Turing machine on a 2-dimensional array, also called a termite
or Langton’s ant [6]. Hence an accounting procedure is performed using Turing
machines that aims to approximate the algorithmic complexity of the identified
structures. This technique is referred to as the Block Decomposition Method
(BDM), as introduced in [37] and [18]. The BDM technique requires a parti-
tion of the adjacency matrix corresponding to the graph into smaller matrices.
With these building blocks at hand we numerically calculate the corresponding
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algorithmic probability by running a large set of small 2-dimensional determin-
istic Turing machines, and then—by applying the algorithmic Coding theorem,
as discussed above—its algorithmic complexity.
Following such a divide-and-conquer scheme we can then approximate the
overall complexity of the original adjacency matrix by the sum of the complexity
of its parts. Note that we have to take into account a logarithmic penalization for
repetition, given that n repetitions of the same object only add log n to its overall
complexity, as one can simply describe a repetition in terms of the multiplicity of
the first occurrence. Technically, this translates into the algorithmic complexity
of a labelled graph G by means of BDM which is defined as follows:
BDM(G, d) =
∑
(ru,nu)∈A(G)d×d
log2(nu) +Km(ru) (1)
where Km(ru) is the approximation of the algorithmic complexity of the sub-
arrays ru arrived at by using the algorithmic Coding theorem, while A(G)d×d
represents the set with elements (ru, nu), obtained by decomposing the adja-
cency matrix of G into non-overlapping squares, i.e. the block matrix, of size
d by d. In each (ru, nu) pair, ru is one such square and nu its multiplicity
(number of occurrences). From now on BDM(G, d = 4) will be denoted only
by BDM(G), but it should be taken as an approximation to C(G) unless oth-
erwise stated (e.g. when taking the theoretical true C(G) value). Once CTM
is calculated, BDM can be implemented as a look-up table, and hence runs
efficiently in linear time for non-overlapping fixed size submatrices.
2.8 Algorithmic Information Dynamics
Unlike most complexity measures that are designed for static objects, except
those related to dynamical systems (e.g. Lyapunov exponents), I have led the
introduction of a measure of algorithmic complexity adapted for dynamical sys-
tems and designed to characterize the change of algorithmic complexity of an
object evolving over time. The measure is universal in the sense that it can deal
with any computable feature that the system may display over time, either spon-
taneously or as a result of an external perturbation/intervention/interaction.
At the core of Algorithmic Information Dynamics [35, 3], the algorithmic
causal calculus that we introduced, is the quantification of the change of com-
plexity of a system under natural or induced perturbations, particularly the
direction (sign) and magnitude of the difference of algorithmic information ap-
proximations denoted by C between an object G, such as a cellular automaton
or a graph and its mutated version G′, e.g. the flip of a cell bit (or a set
of bits) or the removal of an edge e from G (denoted by G\e = G′). The
difference |C(G) − C(G\e)| is an estimation of the shared algorithmic mutual
information of G and G\e. If e does not contribute to the description of G,
then |C(G) − C(G\e)| ≤ log2 |G|, where |G| is the uncompressed size of G,
i.e. the difference will be very small and at most a function of the graph size,
and thus C(G) and C(G\e) have almost the same complexity. If, however,
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|C(G) − C(G\e)| ≤ log2 |G| bits, then G and G\e share at least n bits of al-
gorithmic information in element e, and the removal of e results in a loss of
information. In contrast, if C(G)−C(G\e) > n, then e cannot be explained by
G alone, nor is it algorithmically not contained/derived from G, and it is there-
fore a fundamental part of the description of G, with e as a generative causal
mechanism in G, or else it is not part of G but has to be explained indepen-
dently, e.g. as noise. Whether it is noise or part of the generating mechanism
of G depends on the relative magnitude of n with respect to C(G) and to the
original causal content of G itself. If G is random, then the effect of e will be
small in either case, but if G is richly causal and has a very small generating
program, then e as noise will have a greater impact on G than would removing e
from an already short description of G. However, if |C(G)−C(G\e)| ≤ log2 |G|,
where |G| is, e.g., the vertex count of a graph, or the runtime of a cellular au-
tomaton, G, then e is contained in the algorithmic description of G and can be
recovered from G itself (e.g. by running the program from a previous step until
it produces G with e from G\e).
We have shown how we can infer and reconstruct space-time evolutions by
quantification of the disruptiveness of a perturbation. We can then extract the
generating mechanism from the ordered time indices, from least to most dis-
ruptive, and produce candidate generating models. Simpler rules have simpler
hypotheses, with an almost perfect correspondence in row order. Some systems
may look more disordered than others, but locally the relationship between
single rows is for the most part preserved (indicating local reversibility).
We have shown that the later in time a perturbation is injected into a dy-
namical system the less it contributes to the algorithmic information content
of the overall space-time evolution. We then move from discrete 2D systems to
the reconstruction of phase spaces and space-time evolutions of N -dimensional,
continuous, chaotic, incomplete and even noisy dynamical systems.
3 Computability in Nature
Chaitin’s work has allowed me to frame and attempt to answer questions related
to the random or algorithmic nature of the world and universe: whether it is in
some sense mechanistic and can be reproduced by an artificial mechanism such
as an electronic computer. A first point to note is that we as human observers
access the world through what we call science, at least when we do so formally,
and the aim of science is to perform causal inference from empirical observations
about the world or the universe. And the driver is twofold: to understand the
world and to formulate predictions regarding natural phenomena. The result
of this approach over the last millennia has been quite successful; some may
describe it as incredible, even unreasonable.
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3.1 Cellular automata as inexhaustible pattern generators
The cellular automata (CA) model can be seen as a pattern-generating com-
putational system, and because the model is Turing-complete it is in a formal
sense an inexhaustible source of complexity generation. CA have an intrinsic
parallel nature that make them ideal for visually representing a computation.
We recognize certain CA performing computation as having specific meanings,
for instance, colliders, counters, and majority deciders.
To illustrate the concept of algorithmic complexity, we can represent ECA
rules in a simplified fashion as shown in Fig. 3, featuring the original rule and
the simplified one using wildcards .
The use of ‘wildcards’ allows some sort of trivial compression allowing a
shorter description, and thus tighter upper bounds to Kolmogrov-Chaitin com-
plexity as compared to their original, longer 8-bit descriptions. In Fig. 3 four
ECA are shown, with their rules represented as sets of local rules or icons
followed by their wildcard simplified version, which consists in reducing the de-
scription length of the global rule by looking at ways to compress the local rules.
An implementation of this type of wildcard simplification can be found in the
Wolfram Language under the RulePlot[] function with Appearance → “Simpli-
fied” indicated. Clearly, the more random-looking and complex, the larger the
wildcard description. Each rule allows a greater simplification (compared to its
original 8-bit description) when the rule produces less algorithmically complex
patterns (the number followed by each rule is its Wolfram class).
The simplified rule size as described in Fig. 3 is an a priori algorithmic ran-
domness measure based on a simplification of the CA global rule, and BDM is an
a posteriori observer-oriented measure based Chaitin’s randomness. Introduced
by Wolfram [32], Wolfram’s classes correspond to the typical behaviour of each
ECA based on how often a rule behaves in a certain way for a random initial con-
dition. Classes 1 and 2 are the most simple, while class 3 displays statistically-
random behaviour and class 4 displays random behaviour together with sophis-
ticated structures with which computation can be implemented [32, 1].
In Fig. 4, it is clear how an a priori parameter such as Langton’s λ that
measures the density of non-zeros in the description of a rule as a measure of
complexity deals poorly with the system and is easily outperformed by methods
based on Chaitin’s algorithmic randomness, one of which (BDM) is numerically
based on a variation of Chaitin’s Ω, unlike methods such as LZW and other
popular lossless compression algorithms that are mostly based on Shannon en-
tropy [15]. BDM quantifies algorithmic complexity circumventing the use of any
popular lossless compression algorithm which are misleading as they are closer
to Entropy than to algorithmic complexity [15].
3.2 Science: mapping data to models
So what compression can tell us about the type of knowledge and the way in
which we can access the world?
While the practice of science, and mechanistic models in particular, points
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Rule 255
Estimations of Algorithmic Complexity for different ECA rules
Figure 3: (Top) An example of a cellular automaton, in this case Elementary
Cellular Automaton (ECA) rule 255 which consists in traversing the cells three
by three along each row and converting any three cells starting from the origi-
nal initial condition (a single black cell) and printing another black cell below.
(Middle) ECA cases showing the process of wildcard rule simplification. For
rule 255 the simplified description of the ECA tells us that any black or white
combination of three cells always leads to the same black cell.
towards an algorithmic universe governed by ordered laws and computable prin-
ciples, it is only with the theory of algorithmic randomness that we are able to
mathematically understand and quantify the subtleties in this space of com-
putable models.
The methods that I have developed over the years, building upon the theory
of algorithmic complexity, can help map the space of computable models and
provide the means to access this knowledge by mapping the space of computable
models and observations (data), making them natural underlying candidate
15
Figure 4: An a priori measure based on non-zero density (called Langton’s
lambda or λ) of cellular automata versus tighter bounds of algorithmic random-
ness according to the rule simplification scheme, and one of the most popular
lossless compression algorithms (LZW) used to approximate algorithmic com-
plexity. Values are normalized by the maximum value of each index applied to
all ECA starting from a random initial configuration and letting each rule evolve
for 100 steps. LZW collapses all cases because they are too small to differentiate
them, but even for larger runtimes LZW confounds most classes, particularly 1
with 2, and 3 with 4. In contrast, BDM assigns higher algorithmic randomness
to class 3 compared than to class 4. BDM also collapses the simplest classes 1
and 2 more than simpler indexes, including the popular LZW used and abused
to approximate algorithmic complexity.
mechanistic models of that data (observations). To this end, data is chunked in
smaller pieces as illustrated in Fig. 5, with each piece having a corresponding
candidate computable model from the space of computer programs.
Because the computer power needed to traverse the space is huge (as diffi-
cult as the most difficult computable function, the so-called Busy Beaver prob-
lem [2]), we have used supercomputers in the past and have now proposed also
new methods based on cryptocurrencies that can be exploited to compute the
space, rather than computing useless one-way functions as it is typical for cryp-
tocurrencies.
The resulting algorithmic landscape in Fig. 5 is not flat because different
pieces of data have associated computable models (computer programs) of dif-
ferent lengths, so some parts of the data are more difficult to produce than
others, i.e. require more information to be specified, either because they are
disconnected from the rest or are parts in contact with other systems injecting
new information.
Randomness may sometimes seem to be dominating science, because if we
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Coding Theorem and Block Decomposition Methods
Figure 5: Algorithmic Information Dynamics (AID) guides the exploration and
matching. Together CTM and BDM are the methods at the heart of AID [33,
34, 39], helping to mine and guide the search for computable candidate models
reproducing a piece of data (or the components of a smaller piece of data) from
the space of all computer programs. Automacoin is a cryptocurrency, currently
under development, that illustrates the way in which more responsible computer
power use can help science using methods like CTM and BDM. (Bottom) The
process of block decomposition of a ECA (or any other system) consists in
dividing the CA time-space evolution into smaller blocks for which estimations
of algorithmic randomness are precomputed using the Coding Theorem Method.
This image is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
separate noise from signal it is what appears as noise that bothers science and
is the subject of current investigation. Once science tames noise, it becomes
17
signal, and science moves to the next apparent source of noise.
Science has provided us with all sorts of models, such as statistical and mech-
anistic models. Mechanistic models are very important because they suggest un-
derlying mechanisms as candidates for what may occur with actual phenomena.
A mechanistic/algorithmic approach provides a causal model from first princi-
ples. Unlike a statistical description, it is prescriptive, as it provides guidance
for manipulating causes.
For example, in Fig. 7, a mechanistic model of the solar system is shown.
In a mechanistic model such as this one, if we were forced to place the sun and
the moon at a certain distance from each other in order to reproduce solar and
lunar eclipses, then such a model would suggest a distance that can be verified
or falsified by other means, that in turn may feed back to our model to make it
better. The traditional approach is to consider a model that starts from certain
values, and after some time provides some clue as to where the system may
be at a future time, with some precision and in less time than the time taken
by the actual unfolding of the phenomenon being studied. If a model does not
comply with these requirements then it is traditionally seen as less valuable,
so in general, the more precise and the faster it can be, the better. But more
importantly, a model is better if it can explain more with less.
Figure 6: Patterns all over the surface of the planet made by living organisms
other than humans and far removed from chance, such as fairy rings, basaltic
hexagonal columns, termite mounds. Left: The Giant’s Causeway in Northern
Ireland. Hexagonal basalt columns formed by sea water cooling incandescent
lava relatively quickly, around 60 million years ago, as a result of the interplay
of a small number of forces. Right: A ‘fairy ring’ on the ground is formed
in a natural manner by the differential growth of Micelios mushrooms, i.e. an
extremely simple mechanical process. This image is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
The movement of planets initially appeared to us as ungoverned, and some of
them even seemed to be randomly moving in the sky, and were thus called wan-
derers in Greek. It was not until Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler and later Newton
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that it was found that planets followed rules. But there were some movements
of the internal planets such as Venus, as well as other celestial phenomena,
which could not be fully explained by Newtonian mechanics, and thus General
Relativity was needed—another mechanistic model to explain what again was
apparently random but was found not to be so under the new model.
It is true that moving from one theory to another reveals that we cannot
ever be sure that a given theory definitively explains the data, nor can we say
that these rules or differential equations are followed by nature or physics, yet
it is also undeniable that each iteration of a model is more encompassing, able
to explain not only previously puzzling phenomena but many others as well. In
this sense, the compass of what new theories explain, generally speaking, exceeds
their own lengths. In other words, we gain much more explanatory and even
predictive power with an increasingly compact number of theories over time.
This is not only a clear indication that our world and universe is removed from
randomness, with a handful of models being able to explain almost every aspect
of physical experience, if not human experience, it is also strong evidence of
the algorithmic nature of the world. Indeed, that the universe can be explained
with theories and models of apparently ever-decreasing length means that the
data they describe is formally of low algorithmic randomness, and that finding
ever smaller models among all possible computable models is algorithmically
very likely, which in turn, by the coding theorem, means that the world is
algorithmically simple.
3.3 Pervasiveness of Turing universality
While it was known that Turing universality could be achieved with extreme
simplicity (in terms of resources, i.e. state+symbols), it was not known how
pervasive it was. Once a computer program is Turing universal it can simu-
late any other computer program. Our work is the first to shed some light
on quantifying how pervasive Turing universality may be. It turns out that
the number of Turing-universal machines is of density one, meaning that basi-
cally almost all computer programs are capable of universal computation, given
the appropriate initial conditions [7]. We have also shown how computer pro-
grams previously thought to be essentially different can actually simulate other
computer programs of unbounded complexity. In this sense, we have shown a
complete collapse of the so-called Wolfram classes in a fundamental way [7].
But we have also shown that there is an asymmetry in the number of possi-
ble compilers accessible during a given exhaustive compiler exploration time for
performing these simulations, which reintroduces a hierarchy and re-establishes
the classes from an epistemological perspective. The fundamental collapse, how-
ever, strengthens Wolfram’s so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence.
By way of the aforementioned asymmetry we also defined a topological measure
based upon simulation networks, establishing the degree of difficulty involved in
finding the right compilers to make a program simulate other programs. All this
constitutes a completely novel Bayesian approach to Turing universality and a
powerful framework within which to reprogram a system’s behaviour. These
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ideas are also consistent with my many first views on programmability, based
on Turing’s ’imitation game,’ for testing black box capabilities from input per-
turbation (interrogation) and output assessment. We propose to use the tools
of algorithmic complexity to study such mappings as an ultimate behavioural
evaluation framework.
We have conceived these tools based on the work of Chaitin and the other
founders of AIT as alternatives to compression, tools which allow us to find
underlying models. The methods represent a way to navigate through the space
of all possible (small) computer programs in order to match computable models
with data observations from the real world.
My tools based on Chaitin’s work are helping us understand some aspects
of dynamic systems useful in the context of living systems, and moreover able
to steer and manipulate their behaviour.
Another question of relevance concerns computability versus uncomputabil-
ity. Here again, even assuming that there are noncomputable processes, our
best tools consist in simulating everything in a digital computer by representing
systems and their respective models with computable algorithms, even in those
cases where we are dealing with apparently continuous differential equations,
which, thanks to CPU’s finite precision capabilities, in the end become discrete
and symbolic approximations of these apparent and convenient continuous rep-
resentations (see Fig. 7).
We have seen how we have contributed to matching data with computable
models [35], but how successful and relevant are computable models? The dis-
tinction between models as equations and models as computer programs repre-
sents a gap between the discrete and the continuous that does not seem neces-
sarily fundamental (see Fig. 7). While mechanistic models can also be wrong,
they have the advantage of conforming to the laws of physics on the basis of
which they are constructed, depending on the nature of the model, whether
classical or not. While the model may look analogue because it moves in ap-
parently continuous space and time, measurements are of finite accuracy. Most
models in science today are not only mechanistic but algorithmic, and they run
on electronic digital computers. They are thus computable models of the phys-
ical phenomena they are meant to describe. In other words, modern science
has become a computational science, both in practice and in principle in many
cases, and its power has not diminished. On the contrary, it has never been
more powerful, in both its explanatory and its predictive capacity.
4 Complexity in Nature
4.1 Algorithmic probability in biology
I aim to understand the behaviour of artificial and biological systems from a
computational perspective, and to develop methods to reprogram biological cells
at a molecular/genetic level as we do computers. I do this by combining the
power of the conceptual and methodological advances represented by the formal
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Figure 7: A mechanistic model is a model that can be run and simulated by
mechanical means by setting it in an initial condition, following a set of instruc-
tions, and determining an output, e.g. the state of the model. In this case, for
example, the placement of the planets. Image from Wikipedia under Creative
Commons license.
theories of information (Shannon, Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Solomonoff, Levin, et
al) and computation (as advanced by Turing, Church, Kleene, et al), and by
exploiting the versatility of principles from areas such as dynamical systems and
complex networks, to develop a novel, elegant, and very sophisticated framework
and field, namely algorithmic information dynamics, to help deal with questions
of causation and produce model-driven, generative and mechanistic explanations
for natural and artificial processes.
Biology is mostly discrete, without much room for apparent continuity. Not
only is the genetic code discrete, finite, and composed of 4 letters, genes produce
an integral number of viable proteins that either dock or do not, and genes can
be simulated closely by modelling them as being either on or off. Proteins are
very finite objects. They converge in great numbers, and when they don’t they
most likely never dock or fulfil their purpose. Chemical concentrations that ap-
pear continuous are only a useful representation. Living systems, however, are,
in a manner of speaking, assembled out of chemical LEGO pieces. Even signals
among cells are proteins that can be counted and followed one by one. Living
systems themselves depend on the very binary choice that enables cells to differ-
entiate between themselves and everything else by way of their perfectly limited
membranes. Communication among cells is through the physical interchange of
proteins—the same kind of LEGO pieces are involved here as everywhere else.
And just as with everything else, in most regular cases the piece either docks
and fulfils its purpose or it does not. Even Brownian motion that plays a role in,
e.g., protein folding, is produced by finite and well-defined particles or molecules
interacting with other molecules.
We have explored how non-trivial deterministic systems can display un-
bounded changes in complexity. We have proved that undecidability is essential
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for legitimate forms of OEE definitions and that this is also deeply connected to
open and closed systems, with self-referential state-dependent systems display-
ing a greater degree of versatility. For OEE to be possible (under reasonable
definitions), then open and undecidable dynamic systems are necessary. But
even more important are the results that we have reported regarding the substi-
tution of uniformly distributed mutations for mutations occurring according to
the so-called Universal Distribution that predicts the way in which rule-based
systems behave according to the computational power of their source (see paper
J49). It turns out that this simple and sound substitution (because neither the
world nor physical laws are truly random) can significantly speed up evolution-
ary convergence, may justify the need of genetic memory and modularity (e.g.
gene organization), and even explain phenomena such as diversity explosions
and mass extinctions that have no extrinsic (e.g. climate) explanations.
Equipped with the measures that we have developed, my team and I aim
to tackle a fundamental challenge in science: that of developing tools for causal
discovery [14, 35]. This in order to unveil the design principles and generating
mechanisms of arbitrary dynamic systems. In particular, the development of an
interventional calculus based upon the theory of computability and algorithmic
probability that identifies the key markers in genetic networks with which to
steer and manipulate cell function and cell fate. The range of application of this
work is very general, and aims to generate effective intervention tools to steer
the causal content and thus the fate of artificial and natural complex systems.
I am engaged in devising strategies to understand, test and reprogram artificial
and natural systems as models of computation. I have also devised two mea-
sures for testing the ‘algorithmicity’ and programmability of a system. We also
introduced a perturbation-based calculus to study the information landscape
of complex systems and networks—a calculus capable of unveiling information
on the energy landscape—using a measure of algorithmic (re)programmability
that connects the theory of dynamic systems with (algorithmic) information
theory to reveal the dynamic landscape at the heart of the problem of causality.
I use computer programs as models of the world. Determinism from classical
mechanics implies that everything can be seen as a computer program and that
the complexity of systems led purely by causal elements included in their de-
scription are dominated by their evolving time. This allows us to find clues
to move systems between different functions, thereby effectively reprogramming
them [35].
4.2 Algorithmic intelligence
The human mind is algorithmically biased to suit specific purposes. Some of
these algorithmic mechanisms can replace previously considered biases based
on prior experience (e.g. the so-called system 1). We have known that random
generation tasks, in which people have to generate random-looking sequences,
are linked to some important aspects of mental and cognitive capacities. We
have introduced a new approach to the study of the behaviour of animals and
humans based on algorithmic information theory. We have shown that humans
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best outsmart computers when they are tested on randomness generation at
the age of 25 [4]. When competing against all possible algorithms, we have
found that human behaviour is at its most algorithmically random at 25 years
of age, thereby introducing a new measure of cognitive complexity possibly
related to other biological and cultural phenomena, such as creativity. Indeed,
humans produce more randomness than most computer programs when they
are 25 years old. In parallel, we are also working on measures of integrated
information with which to profile brain networks.
Figure 8: Examples of simple interacting computer programs (top: ECA rules
54 and 50, bottom: ECA rules 82 and 60) with a simple function determining the
interaction from which data emerges and gets convoluted. Different rules come
from different generating sources. In this case different Elementary Cellular
Automata rules. Observers will often face this problem and will not be able
to disentangle data without the right tools. The world is made of this type
of interaction, producing apparent complexity and concealing the underlying
generating rules that new methods can help disentangle [14]. They do not even
have to be complicated in themselves, but when interacting they produce a
highly complex pattern that cannot be quantified with traditional tools, and
may be irreducible.
In Fig. 8, ECA can be seen to be interacting with each other and generat-
ing structures according to a meta CA rule. Often these interactions appear
random, and to an observer they may be difficult to deconvolve or disentangle,
but new methods introduced by my team and based on computability theory
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and the work of Chaitin and Levin (together with the work of Kolmogorov and
Solomonoff) help new machine learning algorithms to distinguish the sources
by their most likely causal generating mechanisms (in this case, each side is
generated by either rules 54 and 50 or 82 and 60) [14].
Most systems in nature are like black boxes that we cannot open and fully
understand, and we are therefore left with approaches not very different from
the black box approach of Alan Turing—his imitation game—for dealing with
the challenge and question of machine intelligence. What we conceived was a
test for systems where questions would be inputs and answers would be com-
pressed. One could then discern the variation among the compressed outcomes
for answers of varying complexity and assess the system’s capabilities. The
idea has evolved into a perturbation algorithmic calculus able to characterize
artificial and biological systems [35, 14].
These tools are becoming a new approach to the whole area of machine
learning and even of Artificial Intelligence, introducing the inferential power of
algorithmic probability to complement the current state of areas such as deep
learning, which are weak on the fundamentals for understanding human intelli-
gence, such as symbol manipulation, logic, inference, and the understanding of
cause and effect.
4.3 An algorithmic universe
Figure 9: Science moves apparently random data from observation to
model/theory. Indeed, scientific models tend to cover previously random data
together with other previously unexplained phenomena. Whether there is a
model that can encompass all other models is an open question, but the ten-
dency so far has been clear, and not an artefact of humans as intelligent or
conscious observers. This image is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 3.0 License.
Certain parts of the universe seem ordered and structured (see Fig. 6). On
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Earth, for example, life is an example of organization and structure, contrasting
with what can be deemed background noise (comparable to what appears on
the screen of an old non-tuned analogue television) left over by the Big Bang
and serving as proof of the state in which the universe found itself after its first
moments of existence. What Turing would probably never have guessed is that
when running random Turing machines, the machines produce highly structured
objects. Could this be merely an interesting analogy or could it perhaps be an
actual indication that the universe is more algorithmic than initially expected?
If so, then Turing machines and computer programs are not just products of the
human imagination, they are perhaps responsible for the order in the universe.
Alan Turing may have had an intuitive answer to this question, as he was also
interested in structure formation and helped found another area in biochemistry
called morphogenesis [5], the study of pattern formation, starting from a simple
shape which would first break its symmetries at random.
We have made great progress at taming apparent randomness since ancient
times, with mathematical logic and rationality to begin with—even if we some-
times seem to be regressing to ancient times. A long time ago we left behind
explanations based on divinity, magic or paranormal phenomena in exchange
for tools such as inference, and statistics. Approaches such as correlation in
regression were very useful but they have been overused and abused, and new
and better tools for dealing with modern causality are badly needed.
With ever-increasing predictive power, science moves random observations
under the explanation of computable models and merges previously computable
models into ever more encompassing models whose program-size may be difficult
to quantify but whose explanatory power is increasingly greater, hence indicat-
ing a clear pattern whereby the universe looks increasingly ordered and of low
Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity (Fig. 10). Science has been mostly motivated
by models, has been a model-driven practice. A case can be made regarding
the size of new models/theories. For example, taken at face value, the descrip-
tion of the equations for General Relativity (GR) may give the impression of
being longer than those for Newtonian classical gravity, hence a possible indi-
cation (upper bounds of comparable measure) of their underlying algorithmic
complexity. However, the GR equations are strictly shorter than the equations
specifying the Newtonian version of gravity plus all the corrections that they
require to account for the phenomena that they cannot account for by them-
selves, such as the movement of the internal planets, in particular the rate of
precession of the perihelion of Mercury’s orbit. In comparison, General Relativ-
ity requires few to no corrections. In other words, Newtonian mechanics would
require a stream of regular adjustments to match the computable accounts of
General Relativity for such phenomena.
One may also argue that even GR can only predict the precession movement
of Mercury for a certain time because of 3-body kinds of phenomena, and this
is right, but the fact that we can predict with extremely high accuracy the
movements of Mercury for the next 1000 years is different from not been able
to account for its movements at all using Newtonian mechanics.
So, in some sense, science can be illustrated as the practice of moving nat-
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ural phenomena from what we as observers perceive as random, towards non-
random phenomena. Science moves empirical data from apparent randomness
to algorithmic non-randomness (Fig. 9). Each one of these phenomena under
the non-random quadrant was previously on the random phenomena quadrant.
One can see that there is also a cascade effect in the right quadrant, with models
explaining all or several other previously advanced models. So the overwhelm-
ing evidence is that the world has a strong algorithmic component, because
science can explain, if not predict, most of what happens in the universe to
an increasingly high degree of accuracy and comprehensiveness. The fact that
these models compress more observations from natural phenomena in a reduced
number of models is an indication that, indeed, compression is comprehension.
Figure 10: This diagram shows in what direction science has successfully been
operating in previous centuries, and how this has been increasingly sped up
in the last century, relying on a handful of fundamental theories that have
unified seemingly disparate areas of science, each time explaining more with
less. The existence of science is evidence of the algorithmic nature of the world,
and the fact that more modern scientific models encompass larger observations
strengthens the hypothesis of an algorithmic universe. This image is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
Even in some non-classical interpretations noise may be only apparent, be-
cause in fact all deterministic trajectories are explored and we just happen to
be in one particular branch of a multiverse. That of course does not solve the
problem of the source of global randomness at the level of the multiverse itself,
determining why we experience only one random universe and not all others.
However, evidence (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10) also suggests that what we think is noise
is often a signal whose source is unknown or irrelevant to a system of interest.
Time has tell again and again that every time there is two seemingly dis-
parate phenomena they are often sides of a common underlying duality or sym-
metry, and that every time that there is a physical constant associated to an
apparent fine-tuned irrational number appearing as a hyper-parameter of our
26
universe, there is an algorithmic model in which such a constant is emergent
from first principles as it has happened in areas such as optics or electromag-
netism. Their presence suggest simpler encompassing underlying computable
models able to collapse seemingly fundamental constants and connect apparent
disparate phenomena.
5 Conclusions
Studying randommness from the computing perspective affords us a framework
for studying the nature of the world that discerns the way in which patterns
in the universe are distributed. In a world of computable processes in which
the laws (like programs) do not have a slantwise distribution, AP (s) would
indicate the probability of a natural phenomenon occurring as a result of running
a program. Distribution AP (s) has an interesting particularity: it can start
from basically anything, and, like a robust distribution, it remains qualitatively
unchanged. It is the process that determines the form of the distribution and
not the initial distribution of the programs. This is important because one does
not make any strong initial assumption about the distribution of the initial
conditions or of the laws of physics.
Computer programs can be looked at from a certain vantage point as laws
of physics. If one starts with a random initial condition (input) and executes
a program chosen at random, there is a very good probability that its final ap-
pearance will be regular, and frequently very well organized. By the same token,
if one were to shoot out particles at random, the probability of groups forming
in the way they do would be so small—in the absence of laws of physics—that
nothing whatsoever would happen in the universe. Perhaps Alan Turing hasn’t
only helped us understand the world of computing machines and computing
programs, founding an entire scientific area, but has also taught us a great deal
about the universe in which we live and how it came to be the way it is. Algo-
rithmic complexity and algorithmic probability may explain the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, showing it to have been
based on very solid foundations.
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